Introduction
In Power and Interdependence, 1 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed a model of international relations that they termed "complex interdependence," wherein national security is not the overriding concern of the world's most powerful countries, military force is largely irrelevant in resolving issues among these states, and multiple channels have developed to facilitate international transactions which have diminished the role of the state. However, whereas Keohane and Nye's complex interdependence model suggests that no issue has replaced national security at the top of the international community's priority list, this paper argues that a hierarchy does indeed exist in the politics of nations. In the post-Cold War era, where force has been all but ruled out in relations among the world's most powerful states, due primarily to a quantitative and qualitative increase in global interdependence, 2 all issues in international relations are subordinate to policies designed to increase the national economic health and raise national living standards, a concept labeled "Economism." One of the working hypothesis of this paper, then, is that governments will forego interests in other issue areas (security, environment, human rights, etc.) if they conflicted with, or could be usefully traded for, advantages in the economic sphere.
In determining issue-area hierarchy, care must be taken in the definition of "security."
Where a nation's survival is threatened, levels of trade and foreign investment are irrelevant. While this truth is axiomatic, it is also not reflective of the current international environment. The survival of the world's largest countries is not in doubt nor is military conflict between them a valid concern of serious observers. This is not to say, however, that military forces are useless for the advancement of national interests. Clearly, the US has forces employed around the world in furtherance of national objectives. Similarly, as will be seen, China has embarked on a military modernization program which she hopes will enhance her regional influence. But it would be a mistake to equate all military activites with "security." Indeed, this paper does not suggest that arms sales, force deployments, and military assistance programs will cease to be tools of international diplomacy; they will, in fact, go on as usual (perhaps even more so in the post-Cold War era). Rather, it argues that since "security" in a national survival sense is no longer an issue among great powers, these lesser military activities are much more subject to influence and constraint by both domestic and international economic imperatives that all countries now place at the top of their political agendas.
On the other hand, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to Third World rogue nations considered potentially hostile to the United States revives "security" in the traditional sense. "Security," more than economics, explains the US concern regarding
Iraq and Iran's efforts to gain a capability to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD). "Economism" does suggest, however, that both the recipient and the great power supplier of WMD technology and hardware can be persuaded to alter their courses in the face of economic inducements and punishments. It also suggests that even the security aspects of WMD proliferation are not universal and absolute-the case study below will point out that depending on the country involved, economic considerations may even take precedence over the US commitment to non-proliferation of WMD.
The evidence that Economism guides the policies of at least two significant state actors, the United States and the People's Republic of China, is overwhelming. 3 Consider the following statement from Wu Yi, the PRC's minister of foreign trade and economic cooperation:
The world after the "Cold War" is still not very peaceful but the predominance of political and military factors in international relations has gradually been replaced by economic factors and economic considerations have become the most active and important factor in international relations. 4 While one might quibble with Ms Yi's distinction between politics and economics, the thrust of her message is clear: economic growth and sustainment has assumed the position of "high politics" in the affairs of states.
In a similar vein, General John Shalikashvili, the nation's highest ranking military member, has said:
The next century is not going to be shaped in a place called Sarajevo, as tragic as that is; the next century is not going to be shaped in Port-auPrince, or Kigali, or Mogadishu. My sense is that the next century is much more going to be shaped in the stock markets of Beijing, Shanghai, or Tokyo . . . My sense is that the kind of world we're entering, where the competition will be very much about economics, where three major economic power centers will compete, Northeast Asia, Europe, and the Americas, where the competition will be about markets and stability in those markets and prosperity in those market places, and where the Rwanda's, the Haiti's, and the Bosnia's are counter to that stability, you will have to be able to use America's forces to achieve our aims short of those where our vital interests are at stake. You must not deny the future president, whoever he may be, the ability to use America's forces to advance and protect our interests, our important interests, but short of them being vital interests. 5 The Chairman's statement suggests that the military component of national security is being increasingly marginalized. Where stock markets are better indicators of national strength than are military forces, the latter are more pertinent to the protection of "important," as opposed to "vital," interests. National interests in the post-Cold War era center nearly exclusively on domestic economic growth and international competitiveness.
Commenting on the most recent showdown with Japan over bilateral trade issues, one
American official remarked that this economic dispute was similar to the military confrontation in Haiti with one major difference: "This is really important." 6 Economism suggests that the world capitalist system "provides the critical environment in which states and classes operate by constraining, shaping, and channeling behavior." 7 Since all of politics is presumed to be guided by economic dictates, it follows that leverage in the economic arena ought to spill over into other issue areas. Conversely, Keohane and Nye argued that "although states may be tempted to draw linkages among issues, such linkages will be generally unsuccessful . . . power resources in one issue area lose some or all of their effectiveness when applied to others." 8 The thrust of this research is to examine the validity of these contradictory claims using the U.S.-China relationship as a case study. More specifically, this paper examines the case of Chinese proliferation of systems and technologies useful for the development of weapons of mass destruction to countries unfriendly to the United States. One set of commentators has offered the following summary of the hypothesis of this study: "China is unbending on human rights because it sees dissidents as a political threat. But we could more easily coerce it on exports, which are only about money. China's $30 billion surplus in U.S. trade far exceeds the money it gets from secret chemical and missile deals. President Clinton's victory on intellectual property shows that if China is forced to choose between arms proliferation and U.S. trade, it will probably choose trade." 9 The presumptive dependent linkage suggested here between trade and security issues has major implications for US regional and international security policy with regard to the People's Republic of China, an area that will also be addressed in the latter portion of this paper.
Why study China in this regard? In the midst of regional uncertainty regarding As depicted in Figure 1, Staff running Boeing and J-4 managing General Dynamics). These relationships are depicted in Figure 2 .
Figure 2. PLA's Arms Export Network
The PLA also has connections with the ostensibly civilian side of China's defense industry to include Norinco (arms exporters), China National Nuclear Industry Corporation (involved in nuclear reactor sales to Iran and Pakistan), and China AeroTechnology Import and Export Corporation (advanced aviation technology). As depicted in Figure 3 , the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) theoretically manages the defense industry, to include arms exports, through
New Era Corporation and its six subsidiaries (bottom row, Fig. 3 ). However, envious of the profits generated by COSTIND, the PLA succeeded where COSTIND had failed in the sale of DF-3A ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia (see Table 1 ).
Figure 3. China's Defense Industry and Trading Firms Network
In all, some observers estimate the PLA has connections with as many as 20,000
companies. 9 Even this may be the tip of the iceberg in that many of these PLA subsidiaries Many of these systems demonstrate a clear Chinese interest in developing a power projection capability which, combined with Beijing's unswerving claims in the South China Sea, has heightened concern for regional stability. China's ability to cover the Spratly Islands has also been enhanced by the construction of an airbase on Woody Island in the Paracels from which advanced fighter-bombers could be launched. Even if the PLA's overall military modernization program is of no immediate concern to the U.S. defense establishment, one facet of their efforts to generate income for modernization clearly concerns Washington-the proliferation of technology associated with weapons of mass destruction, a topic to which we now turn. 
PRC Proliferation Activities
In addition to the steady build-up of PRC military capabilities, Sino-U.S. relations have been strained over the on-going dispute regarding Chinese weapons proliferation to other Third World countries, particularly those that the U.S. regards as rogue nations. Tacit Acceptanc e * Although the Range/Payload specifications of the M-11 appear to be within MTCR guidelines of 300 km and 500 kg, the US has argued, and the Chinese have accepted (in their October 1994 agreement), that the missile has an inherent capability to exceed these criteria. ** Sanctions were applied under unilateral U.S. law (Arms Export Control Act and Export Administration Act), since the MTCR has no enforcement mechanisms. *** Although cruise missiles are not covered by the MTCR, this incident may violate a unilateral U.S. law (an amendment to the 1993 defense authorization act requiring sanctions on any country that transfers advanced conventional weapons to either Iran or Iraq).
For a proud country committed to becoming a leading regional and international power and a force for peace and stability, international honor, prestige, and probity are indispensable elements of diplomatic fare. It is difficult to believe that the Chinese would knowingly ignore these factors. Thus, we would do well to search for alternative explanations, which will be explored below.
Chinese Proliferation of Nuclear Technology. Equally troubling for Western
democracies is China's seemingly cavalier attitude regarding recipients of its nuclear technology. Although a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1992, China has been linked with nuclear technology transfers to Pakistan, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. 4 While prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons and weapons-making technology to non-nuclear states, the NPT expressly permits nuclear technology assistance for peaceful energy projects to assist non-nuclear countries in their economic development. The problem for Western states, of course, is that nuclear technology transferred to "rogue" nations, many of which are Chinese clients, can be applied to clandestine nuclear weapons programs.
China has reportedly supplied Pakistan (not a signatory to the NPT) with weapons grade uranium, 5 tritium (used to achieve fusion in hydrogen bombs), 6 and even a design for a 25 kiloton implosion device. 7 China has also signed a contract to build a 300 megawatt nuclear power reactor for Pakistan even though Japan, Germany, and France have reportedly denied provision of nuclear supporting systems for this reactor in accordance with Nuclear Suppliers Group policy. Despite this lack of Western support, China believes the reactor can be complete by the year 2000.
China's past problems with nuclear-capable India are reflected in the cozy nuclear relationship with Pakistan, a partnership that is foreboding given continued India-Pakistani animosity. Most recently, the CIA has determined that the China National Nuclear
Company has delivered 5000 ring magnets, used in the uranium enrichment process, to Pakistan. 8 It is likely that such a transfer violates the U.S. 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (but not the technical terms of the NPT), a determination that would require $10-11 billion worth of sanctions to U.S. companies doing business with China in the form of a cutoff of US Export-Import Bank loan guarantees, all in response to this single $70,000 ring magnet sale. 9 These sanctions could be waived by the President if he determines a waiver would be "in the national interest."
The quick mobilization of business forces to oppose the imposition of sanctions in this most recent Pakistani incident once again emphasizes the potency of Economism.
Representatives from Boeing, AT&T, and Westinghouse argued vigorously against sanctions, the latter citing the potential immediate loss of a $23 million sales of turbine components for use in China's electricity-generating nuclear power plants. Similarly, citing both short and long term detrimental economic implications, the US State and
Commerce departments both urged a quick waiver of any sanctions imposed 10 followed by more targeted sanctions against the China National Nuclear Corporation itself, a recommendation the President appeared to be leaning towards in late March 1996. 11 Even the last clear vestige of a traditional US security concern, proliferation of technology associated with weapons of mass destruction, can be marginalized in the face of economic considerations.
To date, Chinese nuclear technology support to Iran has fallen generally within the framework of the NPT, to which Iran is a signatory. IAEA teams have investigated Iranian sites in pre-announced inspections and found no NPT violations. Still, the US and others fear the transfer of dual-use technology to this Islamic fundamentalist state, whose ambitions in the region are suspect and whose nuclear motivations are easily discernible in light of the nuclear aspirations of Israel, Iraq, and others in the Mideast. As Iraq has demonstrated, a covert nuclear weapons program is possible even where a country is a member of the NPT, and IAEA safeguards are already in place. Moreover, many observers question the Iranian need for nuclear power in a country that is energy-rich.
The Iranians are also involved in a $2 billion-a-year military buildup and have attempted to import nuclear components that are inconsistent with a peaceful nuclear power program. CIA Director James Woolsey has testified that China's nuclear relationship with Iran, Syria, and Algeria all appear to be NPT-compliant, although the Pakistani-PRC connection is "of greater concern." Still, China does not require IAEA safeguards on all nuclear materials transferred and it is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a 27-member regime (which includes Russia) whose intent is to expand the NPT requirements into dual-use nuclear material (membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group is not required by the NPT). Continued Chinese secrecy in ballistic missile and nuclear-related material transfers will likely remain a concern for Western countries and an obstacle to improving overall relationships. Neither a treaty nor an executive agreement, it is instead a set of guidelines that "member" countries agree to abide by with regards to the selling or transfer of systems, subsystems, or components of missile systems capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. A missile with a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles) and a payload of 500 kilograms (1100 pounds) was deemed to fall into that category. Unlike the IAEA, no organization exists to monitor compliance, although the US has passed domestic legislation (Arms Export Control Act and Export Administration Act) that has the effect of implementing MTCR guidelines. Neither China nor the former Soviet Union was approached for original membership. In January 1993, the MTCR guidelines were expanded to include missiles capable of delivering chemical and biological munitions. China agreed to abide by the earlier guidelines but not the latter, although the M-9 and M-11 missiles are covered by the earlier protocol. 2 11 Erlanger, op. cit. 12 Nucleonics Week (24 September 1992, October 1, 1992) reported that Iran had nearly procured a plutonium production research reactor from China and important fuel cycle systems from Argentina. The US was successful in halting these shipments, with MFN conditionality a factor in China's case.
Chapter 4 Explaining Chinese Proliferation
The tendency to look at Chinese proliferation activities as deriving from some unitary projects with Pakistan and Iran after Chinese assurances to the US that these activities would be halted. 6 The lack of "willful" proliferation by the central government was cited by Chinese officials who claim that companies such as the China National Nuclear
Corporation retain a significant amount of independence to make this type of open sale, an argument that the Administration is considering in their response to the ring magnet transfer. 7 In a similar vein, Kenneth Lieberthal feels that the dispersal of political power within the PRC accounts for apparent violations within the economic sphere regarding intellectual property rights and market access as well as proliferation activities. financial assistance and co-production/development programs. 5 As past experience has shown, US willingness to rigorously apply such sanctions to China as a result of this meant-for-public-consumption legislation remains dubious. China adheres to the principle that armaments should only be used for defensive purposes and an arms race should be averted at all costs. 19 The US could test this resolution through a combination of both bilateral and multilateral approaches: US-made, high technology defensive weapons systems for formal Chinese accession to the MTCR and New Forum membership. 20 One possible option would be sale of F-16 Air Defense
Fighters, a modified version of the F-16 that has no air-to-ground capabilities, only enhanced air intercept features. 
Notes
1 Chas Freeman, former assistant defense secretary for international security affairs, has said that "repeated U.S. efforts to discourage Chinese missile sales to Iran and Syria have proved successful in the past." Opall, "U.S. Queries China on Iran," op cit., p. 50. 2 Steven Flank, "Nonproliferation Policy: A Quintet for Two Violas?," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1994, p. 76.
